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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
                         I.  INTRODUCTION 
         Appellant Dayhoff, Inc. initiated this diversity of 
citizenship action on October 29, 1993, alleging breach of 
contract, tortious interference with contract, fraud, and civil 
conspiracy against various of the appellees.  The action arose 
out of the termination of three contracts between Dayhoff and 
appellee Heinz Dolciaria S.p.A. involving the manufacture and 
sale of candies in the United States.  The terminations followed 
the sale of the Heinz Dolciaria candy business to appellee 
Hershey Foods Corporation.  The district court dismissed 
Dayhoff's claims related to two of the contracts because of 
arbitration and forum selection clauses, and dismissed all claims 
for lack of personal jurisdiction against appellee Heinz Italia 
S.p.A.  Heinz Italia is the parent corporation of Heinz Dolciaria 
and, in turn, is a subsidiary of appellee H.J. Heinz Co.  After 
additional discovery with respect to the third contract, the 
court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on all 
remaining claims.  After Dayhoff appealed, the district court 
directed entry of a final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 
and Dayhoff then appealed again.  We have consolidated the 
appeals for disposition in this opinion.   
         Dayhoff is a California corporation with its principal 
place of business in California.  H.J. Heinz Co. is a 
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in 
Pennsylvania.  Hershey Foods Corporation is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.  
Appellees Heinz Italia S.p.A., Heinz Dolciaria S.p.A., and 
Sperlari s.r.l. are Italian corporations, with their principal 
places of business in Italy.  As the monetary threshold for 
diversity jurisdiction was met, the district court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1332.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C.  1291. 
 
         II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                     A.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
                   1.  The License Agreement 
         Dayhoff Australia Pty, Ltd., and Sperlari S.p.A. 
entered into a License Agreement on October 19, 1989, pursuant to 
which Sperlari S.p.A. granted Dayhoff Australia the exclusive 
license to make and sell Frutteto candy in the United States as 
of June 1990.  Dayhoff Australia has assigned its rights and 
obligations under the agreement to Dayhoff.  The ten-year term of 
the License Agreement expires October 19, 1999, but the agreement 
permits Dayhoff to continue thereafter to manufacture and market 
Frutteto candy in the United States under a non-exclusive, 
royalty-free license.  Article 21 of the agreement provides that 
Italian law will govern its interpretation and Article 22 
provides that any disputes relating to it will be adjudicated in 
an arbitration proceeding in Italy: 
         22.  ARBITRATION 
         All controversies arising from the present 
         contract or relating to the same will be 
         definitively settled according to the 
         Reconciliation and Arbitration Rules of the 
         International Chamber of Commerce, excluding 
         recourse to the common law courts, by one or 
         more arbitrators appointed in accordance with 
         these Rules. 
 
         The arbitration tribunal will decide on its 
         competence to decide the matter and on the 
         validity of the arbitration clause. 
 
         Each party can apply to the relevant Law 
         Courts to confirm the arbitration sentence or 
         enforce execution of the same.            
         Arbitration proceedings will take place in 
         Milan. 
App. at 46.   
            2.  The Frutteto Distribution Agreement 
         On July 26, 1990, Dayhoff and Sperlari S.p.A. signed 
the Frutteto Distribution Agreement, which provides that Dayhoff 
will be the exclusive United States distributor of Frutteto 
candy.  The contract does not have a set term, but, like the 
License Agreement, contains a governing law clause: 
         B.  GOVERNING LAW 
         This Agreement shall be governed and 
         constructed in accordance with the laws of 
         Italy and the parties hereto irrevocably 
         submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
         Court of Cremona (Italy). 
App. at 49.  In April 1992, Sperlari S.p.A. assigned its rights 
under the 1989 Frutteto Licensing Agreement and the 1990 Frutteto 
Distribution Agreement to Heinz Dolciaria.  App. at 198. 
           3.  The Bulk Candy Distribution Agreement 
         Dayhoff and Heinz Dolciaria executed the Bulk Candy 
Distribution Agreement on July 17, 1992.  Pursuant to this 
agreement, Dayhoff became Heinz Dolciaria's exclusive United 
States distributor of certain candies other than Frutteto candy.  
The Bulk Candy Distribution Agreement has an eight-year term that 
expires at the earliest on July 17, 2000.  The agreement provides 
that disputes arising from it are to be litigated in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
and that the agreement will be construed in accordance with 
Pennsylvania law.  App. at 50-67.  Thus, the three agreements 
provide for three different fora for adjudicating disputes and 
provide for the law of two countries to apply to their 
interpretation.  As we shall see, this fractured approach to 
dispute resolution under related contracts has led to great 
expense and confusion and, we are afraid, will continue to do so. 
         Because some of Dayhoff's claims are based on events 
surrounding the negotiation of the 1992 Distribution Agreement, 
the facts relating to the negotiation of that agreement require 
further discussion.  The district court rejected Dayhoff's claims 
related to this agreement on summary judgment; therefore, we will 
present the facts pertaining to these claims in the light most 
favorable to Dayhoff.  See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230-32 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993); see also Berner Int'l Corp. v. Mars 
Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 978 (3d Cir. 1993). 
         The parties negotiated the Bulk Candy Distribution 
Agreement through numerous facsimiles between the United States 
and Italy.  On June 4, 1992, Luigi Volta, then a long-time 
employee of Heinz Dolciaria and currently employed by Sperlari 
s.r.l., a successor corporation to Heinz Dolciaria, informed 
Dayhoff that "[t]his is our last and final proposition."  Sealed 
app. at 1011-12.  On June 8, 1992, Volta informed Dayhoff that an 
agreement was "reachable" and invited Uday Lele, president of 
Dayhoff, to come to Cremona, Italy, to "finalize" the agreement.  
Id. at 1013. 
         Shortly thereafter, Lele traveled to Cremona to sign 
the agreement.  According to Dayhoff, Lele understood that the 
negotiations were virtually over and that the contract terms 
would follow the facsimiles.  However, when he arrived in Italy 
to sign the contract, Lele learned that Antonella Giacobone, an 
attorney for Heinz Italia, would be at the meeting, as would  
Volta and Franco Seletti.  Seletti, also a former employee of 
Heinz Dolciaria, now employed by Sperlari s.r.l., is above Volta 
in the corporate ladder. 
         Lele never had met or dealt with Giacobone, and there 
had never been an attorney present during previous negotiations 
between Dayhoff and Heinz Dolciaria or their predecessors, or at 
the execution of their previous contracts.  Lele had not been 
given advance notice that Giacobone would be at the meeting, and 
no one had suggested that he might want to bring his own lawyer.  
Dayhoff alleges that when Lele asked Giacobone why she was 
present, she advised him that she would protect Dayhoff's 
interests as well as those of Heinz Dolciaria, and that she was 
Dayhoff's de facto attorney in connection with the negotiation of 
the contract. 
         At the meeting, Giacobone presented Lele with a draft 
of the Bulk Candy Distribution Agreement that he had not seen 
during the parties' previous negotiations.  The draft contained a 
termination provision similar to section 14.3, the one 
ultimately incorporated into the final agreement.  According to 
Dayhoff, Heinz Dolciaria had not discussed the termination 
provision with it previously.  Thus, the provision had not been 
incorporated in the parties' prior drafts or agreements. 
         At his deposition, Lele testified that he inquired into 
the meaning of this provision at the meeting: 
              I asked Antonella Giacobone what this 
         meant, and she said, Mr. Lele, you are 
         operating in the American market.  Heinz USA 
         is one of the most well-known food companies, 
         we don't want you to use the Heinz name to 
         sell your company to somebody else and become 
         a rich man and we get left holding the baby 
         and having to deal with somebody we don't 
         want to deal with.  That is what she told me. 
Sealed app. at 743-44.  Dayhoff alleges that when Lele asked  
Giacobone specifically what the termination provision meant, she 
did not tell him that the appellees could invoke the clause when 
Heinz Italia rather than Dayhoff sold its business.  Instead, 
Dayhoff alleges, she advised him that the provision protected 
Heinz Dolciaria in the event that Dayhoff was sold or its assets 
assigned.  Moreover, Dayhoff alleges that in connection with 
Giacobone's explanation of the clause, she told Lele that "[s]he 
would be taking care of both our interests."  Br. at 9.  Dayhoff 
further claims that Volta confirmed Giacobone's representations 
as to the meaning of the termination clause by telling Lele that 
the provision was intended to protect Heinz Dolciaria in the 
event that Dayhoff sold or assigned its assets to another 
company. 
         Dayhoff thus asserts that no one informed Lele that the 
clause would entitle Heinz Dolciaria to terminate the contract 
without compensation in the event that Heinz Dolciaria underwent 
a change of control or sold its assets.  Indeed, Dayhoff claims 
that explanatory statements to Lele by Giacobone and Volta were 
inconsistent with such an interpretation.  Dayhoff states that 
Lele understood the agreement to mean that Heinz Dolciaria would 
not have the right to terminate the contract if Heinz Dolciaria 
sold or transferred its assets to another corporation. 
         Dayhoff claims that only after it initiated this 
litigation did the appellees assert that the termination clause 
entitled Heinz Dolciaria to terminate the contract without 
compensation when Heinz Italia sold the confectionery business.  
Giacobone then testified that she had included the clause for 
this specific purpose.  At her deposition, Giacobone further 
claimed that she "intended to cover every possible . . . legal or 
financial way in which our [Heinz Italia's] confectionery 
business could be sold . . . ."  Sealed app. at 1032-33.  Dayhoff 
claims that Giacobone did not deny, however, that she failed to 
disclose this information when Lele specifically questioned the 
meaning of section 14.3. 
             4.  Performance of the Three Contracts 
         Dayhoff consistently performed its obligations under 
the three contracts and created a market for Heinz Dolciaria's 
candies in the United States.  Dayhoff claims to have invested 
more than $1.6 million in performing the contracts.  As proof of 
its satisfactory performance, Dayhoff asserts that as recently as 
September 30, 1993, Heinz Dolciaria asked Dayhoff to expand its 
operations to distribute additional Heinz Dolciaria candies.  
Dayhoff expected enormous financial returns from its substantial 
investment. 
             5.  Termination of the Three Contracts 
         According to Dayhoff, as early as March 1993, H.J. 
Heinz and Heinz Italia, without Dayhoff's knowledge, began 
negotiating the sale of Heinz Dolciaria's business to Hershey.  
Dayhoff alleges that when it learned about this impending 
transaction and inquired as to its effect on its contracts, Heinz 
Dolciaria assured it that there would be no effect and that there 
was no reason to terminate the contracts.  Yet, according to 
Dayhoff, H.J. Heinz, Heinz Italia, and Hershey even then were 
searching for ways to terminate the contracts.  On September 13, 
1993, Giacobone sent a letter to Hershey discussing the contracts 
in detail with particular reference to the termination 
provisions.  The letter indicated that Lele was "well known and 
appreciated" by Sperlari S.p.A.'s (i.e., Heinz Dolciaria's) sales 
managers.  Sealed app. at 59-60. 
         On September 14, 1993, Heinz Italia sold virtually all 
of its confectionery business to Hershey Holding Company, a 
subsidiary of Hershey Foods Corporation, for $133,000,000.  Heinz 
Italia accomplished the sale through the formation of a new 
company, Sperlari s.r.l.; the transfer of substantially all the 
assets and liabilities of the confectionery business to Sperlari 
s.r.l.; and the sale of Sperlari's stock to Hershey Holding 
Company.  As a condition of that sale, Hershey insisted on 
termination of the Dayhoff contracts, and thus when Hershey 
purchased the confectionery business the Dayhoff contracts were 
not included.  The closing memorandum of the sale shows that 
Hershey's purchase did not include the contracts, Heinz Italia 
agreed to terminate the Dayhoff contracts, and Heinz Italia 
agreed to indemnify Hershey from any liabilities arising from the 
termination of the contracts.  Sealed app. at 940-41. 
         According to Dayhoff, Seletti deliberately decided to 
conceal the termination decision from it.  Hence, Dayhoff claims 
that it was not informed of the termination and continued to 
devote itself exclusively to the promotion of the Sperlari name 
and products and continued to inform Seletti and Volta of its 
efforts.  Dayhoff alleges that, even as Lele was invited to visit 
Milan to discuss the parties' continuing business relationship 
and the extension of the Bulk Candy Distribution Agreement to 
include additional candies, Seletti and Volta were providing 
Hershey with confidential information concerning Dayhoff's 
business. 
         By letter dated September 28, 1993, at Hershey's 
direction and insistence, Heinz Italia issued a letter 
terminating Heinz Dolciaria's three contracts with Dayhoff:  
         As you may have heard, we recently sold all 
         our confectionery business to the Hershey 
         Group.  As a consequence, we hereby notify 
         you [of] our decision to forthwith terminatethe [License 
Agreement, Frutteto Distribution 
         Agreement, and Bulk Candy Distribution 
         Agreement].  The Frutteto Distributorship and 
         the Bulk Candies Distributorship are 
         terminated also for your failure to attain 
         respectively the Minimum Quantities and the 
         Minimum Purchases. 
Sealed app. at 950 (emphasis in original).  Dayhoff notes that 
Heinz Italia did not mention section 14.3 of the Bulk Candy 
Distribution Agreement in the September 28, 1993 termination 
letter. 
         Giacobone called Volta after she saw the September 28, 
1993 termination letter to express her concern regarding 
Dayhoff's likely reaction.  Volta assured Giacobone that there 
was no problem with terminating the Bulk Candy Distribution 
Agreement because of the contract's termination provision.  On 
the other hand, Volta expressed concern that there was no 
justification for terminating the Frutteto Distribution 
Agreement.  Dayhoff alleges that at that time Giacobone reassured 
Volta by reminding him of the contract clause providing for an 
Italian forum, and stating that Dayhoff might not be willing to 
pursue its rights in Italy.  Sealed app. at 1101-04.  Dayhoff 
reacted to the termination letter by informing Heinz Dolciaria 
that the purported terminations were invalid and had no effect 
because there were no grounds for the terminations and because 
Heinz Italia, which was not a party to the contracts, could not 
terminate them. 
         Since the termination, Hershey has announced to 
Dayhoff's customers that Hershey soon would begin selling candies 
in the United States where Dayhoff has exclusive United States 
rights.  As a result, Dayhoff claims that its sales have declined 
dramatically and its standing in the United States candy market 
has been shattered. 
 
                      B.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         Dayhoff initiated this action on October 29, 1993.  In 
its amended complaint, Dayhoff alleged claims against Heinz 
Dolciaria for breach of all three contracts.  Dayhoff also 
asserted breach of contract claims against Sperlari s.r.l. on the 
ground that it took over Heinz Dolciaria's business when Heinz 
Dolciaria effectively was stripped of its assets.  Dayhoff does 
not assert breach of contract claims against Hershey, H.J. Heinz, 
or Heinz Italia.  Dayhoff, however, asserts claims for tortious 
interference with contract against all appellees except Heinz 
Dolciaria.  Dayhoff asserts claims against all appellees for 
fraud and conspiracy, and seeks the imposition of a constructive 
trust on all proceeds from the sale of Heinz Italia's 
confectionery business and all proceeds from the manufacture and 
sale of Heinz Dolciaria or Sperlari s.r.l. candies in the United 
States.  It also seeks restitution from Hershey, Sperlari s.r.l., 
and Heinz Dolciaria, and reformation of the change of control 
termination provision of the Bulk Candy Distribution Agreement.  
Dayhoff Australia originally was a plaintiff in the suit; 
however, Dayhoff Australia prior to the institution of the suit 
had transferred and assigned to Dayhoff its rights under the 1989 
License Agreement.  Thus, it was dropped as a plaintiff.   
         On March 14, 1994, the appellees made a joint motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment.  On October 3, 1994, the court, 
through Judge Ambrose, dismissed Dayhoff's claims relating to the 
License Agreement on the ground that the agreement compelled 
Dayhoff to arbitrate all claims arising from it against all 
appellees, including those who had not signed it.  The district 
court also dismissed all of Dayhoff's claims relating to the 
Frutteto Distribution Agreement on the ground that Dayhoff was 
compelled to litigate those claims in the courts of Cremona, 
Italy.  Finally, the district court dismissed all claims against 
Heinz Italia for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Thus, this 
initial disposition left outstanding only Dayhoff's claims under 
the Bulk Candy Distribution Agreement against the appellees other 
than Heinz Italia.   
         The case then was transferred to Judge Cindrich, who, 
on July 10, 1995, granted summary judgment in favor of the 
appellees on Dayhoff's remaining claims related to the Bulk Candy 
Distribution Agreement.  Dayhoff then appealed.  We are 
exercising plenary review. 
         We note that insofar as we are aware, notwithstanding 
the October 3, 1994 order, the parties have not instituted 
arbitration or litigation proceedings in Italy.  Dayhoff claims 
that Hershey, Sperlari s.r.l., and H.J. Heinz did not consent to 
jurisdiction of the arbitration in Milan or litigation in the 
courts of Cremona until after the district court conditioned its 
dismissal of Dayhoff's claims on that consent.  Dayhoff's consent 
neither was sought nor given. 
 
                        III.  DISCUSSION 
                A.  THE 1989 AND 1990 AGREEMENTS 
         Dayhoff's initial argument is that the district court 
erred in dismissing its claims related to the 1989 and 1990 
Frutteto agreements because, in Dayhoff's view, the arbitration 
and forum selection clauses of those agreements, on which the 
district court relied in reaching its result, do not apply to all 
of the appellees and, indeed, are not effective at all.  Dayhoff 
bases its argument that the clauses are not effective as to all 
the appellees principally on our opinion in Kaplan v. First 
Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503 (3d Cir. 1994), which the 
Supreme Court affirmed in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995). 
         Dayhoff asserts that the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Kaplan strongly emphasized that parties cannot be required to 
arbitrate a dispute unless they specifically and expressly have 
agreed to arbitration.  It claims that the district court's 
holding that Dayhoff was required to arbitrate its claims with 
Hershey under the License Agreement because that was 
"reasonable," even though Hershey was not a party to the 
contract, was erroneous and inconsistent with Kaplan.  Dayhoff 
further claims that in crafting its standard of reasonableness, 
the district court ignored the threshold issue of whether it is 
proper, as a matter of law, to compel Dayhoff to arbitrate its 
claims against Hershey, a stranger to the License Agreement, 
where Dayhoff has not agreed to arbitrate with Hershey.  Dayhoff 
asserts that Kaplan unequivocally held that such compulsion is 
improper where, as here, there is no agreement to arbitrate 
between the relevant parties. 
         In Kaplan, the Supreme Court affirmed our decision 
directing the district court to vacate an arbitration award 
against a party who had not agreed to arbitrate.  115 S.Ct. at 
1926.  Exercising de novo review, we held that the Kaplans could 
not be compelled to arbitrate claims made pursuant to various 
contracts because they individually had not signed the specific 
contract containing the arbitration clause, although they had 
signed related contracts.  Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1516. 
         The Kaplans were not obligated to arbitrate because 
they had not agreed to do so.  As the Supreme Court wrote: 
         [A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract 
         between the parties; it is a way to resolve 
         those disputes -- but only those disputes -- 
         that the parties have agreed to submit to 
         arbitration. 
115 S.Ct. at 1924 (citations omitted).  Further, the Court stated 
that: 
         After all, the basic objective in this area 
         is not to resolve disputes in the quickest 
         manner possible, no matter what the parties' 
         wishes, but to ensure that commercial 
         arbitration agreements, like other contracts, 
         'are enforced according to their terms.' 
Id. at 1925 (citations omitted). 
         Dayhoff claims that Kaplan is particularly significant 
because one of the individual defendants in that case, Manuel 
Kaplan, was the president, director, and the sole shareholder of 
the defendant corporation, which was obligated to arbitrate 
because Kaplan had signed a contract containing an arbitration 
clause on its behalf.  Nonetheless, Kaplan himself was not 
obligated to arbitrate the claims against him because he had not 
entered into an agreement to arbitrate individually, although he 
had signed related agreements.  Dayhoff points out that if 
reasonableness or a close relationship were sufficient cause to 
compel a non-party to arbitrate, Kaplan would have been a prime 
candidate for arbitration.  However, Dayhoff notes that we 
rejected any test for determining whether a party had to 
arbitrate other than a determination of what the contract's terms 
provided: 
         Arbitration is fundamentally a creature of 
         contract . . . 'arbitrators derive their 
         authority to resolve disputes only because 
         the parties have agreed in advance to submit 
         such grievances to arbitration.' 
19 F.3d at 1512 (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications 
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 (1986)).  
Dayhoff argues that Kaplan thus discredits the theory that as 
long as an arbitration clause is applicable to the contracting 
parties, it is proper to bring into the arbitration all of the 
parties to the dispute even though they are not parties to the 
agreement, and thus have not agreed to arbitrate.  Accordingly, 
since Dayhoff and Hershey did not agree to arbitrate, Dayhoff 
asserts that it cannot be required to do so. 
         Further, Dayhoff notes that a year after it commenced 
this litigation, Hershey gave its consent to arbitration in 
Italy, but only after the district court had required such 
consent as a condition of dismissing the action against it.  
Dayhoff claims that the very existence of this consent 
underscores its point that there is no legal basis for requiring 
either Hershey or Dayhoff to arbitrate in Italy, because the mere 
fact that Hershey cannot be compelled to do so demonstrates that 
Dayhoff should not be required to take its claims there either. 
         Dayhoff applies its arguments relating to the 
arbitration clause of the 1989 Licensing Agreement to the forum 
selection clause of the 1990 Frutteto Distribution Agreement, 
arguing that Kaplan would not countenance sending the parties to 
a foreign court, absent a valid agreement selecting that court.  
Dayhoff claims that the rationale of Kaplan thus governs the 
forum selection clause, and that Hershey's belated consent to the 
jurisdiction of the Italian courts is simply irrelevant, except 
that it shows that there was no agreement between Dayhoff and 
Hershey to resort to the Italian forum. 
         In response, appellees argue that the 1989 Licensing 
Agreement and the 1990 Frutteto Distribution Agreement contained, 
respectively, a valid arbitration clause and a valid forum 
selection clause.  Appellees claim that the district court 
correctly relied on these clauses in dismissing Dayhoff's claims 
relating to these two agreements, and thereby acted consistently 
with precedent that upholds the enforceability of such clauses.  
Further, appellees argue that these clauses not only apply to 
breach of contract claims, but also to tort claims arising from 
contractual relations.  Br. at 15.  Appellees principally rely 
upon the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th 
Cir. 1988).  
         Manetti-Farrow involved claims arising from the 
termination of the North American distributor of Gucci 
Accessories.  The distribution agreement between the North 
American distributor and a Gucci Italian affiliate (Gucci 
Parfums) included a forum selection clause requiring litigation 
of "any controversy regarding interpretation or fulfillment of 
the present contract" in Italy.  Id. at 511.  Following its 
termination, the North American distributor commenced litigation 
in the United States against Gucci Parfums, its Italian parent 
(Guccio Gucci), an American Gucci affiliate (Gucci America), and 
various employees and directors of the corporate defendants.  The 
North American distributor asserted a variety of claims against 
these defendants, including tortious interference with 
contractual relations.  Id. 
         The North American distributor argued that the forum 
selection clause should not apply to its tort claims, 
particularly those claims it was asserting against parties other 
than Gucci Parfums who were not parties to the forum selection 
clause.  The district court rejected this argument, and the court 
of appeals affirmed.  The court of appeals concluded first that 
the forum selection clause did apply to the tort claims asserted 
by the North American distributor, stating that "[w]hether a 
forum selection clause applies to tort claims depends on whether 
resolution of the claims relates to interpretation of the 
contract."  Id. at 514.  The court concluded that all of the 
North American distributor's claims required interpretation of 
the contract and therefore fell within the scope of the forum 
selection clause.  The court further concluded that the forum 
selection clause applied to all defendants, even those who were 
not parties to the forum selection clause.  It reasoned that "the 
alleged conduct of the non-parties is so closely related to the 
contractual relationship that the forum selection clause applies 
to all defendants."  Id. at 514 n.5. 
         Relying upon the reasoning of the court of appeals in 
Manetti-Farrow, appellees argue that the district court  
correctly concluded that all of Dayhoff's claims relating to the 
1989 and 1990 Frutteto agreements should be dismissed.  SeeDayhoff, Inc. 
v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 93-1794, slip op. at 9 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 3, 1994) ("Although Heinz, Heinz Italia, Sperlari s.r.l. 
and Hershey are not parties to the Agreements, their conduct is 
so closely related to the contractual relationship between Heinz 
Dolciaria and Dayhoff that we find that the forum selection 
clause applies to all Defendants.").  Appellees further rely on 
similar decisions of other courts.  See br. at 18 (citing Coastal 
Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d 
Cir.) ("[T]he law of contracts . . . has long recognized that 
third-party beneficiary status does not permit the avoidance of 
contractual provisions otherwise enforceable."), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 938, 104 S.Ct. 349 (1983); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 
3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993) (noncontracting defendants 
subject to forum selection clause because integrally related to 
contracting defendants such that suit should be kept in a single 
forum), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1057 (1994); TAAG Linhas Aereas 
de Angola v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351, 1354 
(9th Cir. 1990) (forum selection clause can restrict third-party 
beneficiary to designated forum; it is not unreasonable or unjust 
to enforce clause when all other defendants agree to jurisdiction 
in the selected forum); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc 
Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1988) ("When the 
charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on 
the same facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer 
claims against the parent to arbitration even though the parent 
is not formally a party to the arbitration agreement.")). 
         Appellees claim that neither the decision of the 
Supreme Court nor that of this court in Kaplan controls the 
result of this case.  Appellees assert that Kaplan involved 
different legal issues and different factual circumstances from 
those here.  First, appellees read the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Kaplan narrowly, claiming that the case solely addressed two 
questions relating to standards of review to be applied to 
district court decisions by courts of appeals.  More generally, 
however, appellees claim that the case did not present the issue 
before us.  In particular, appellees claim that: 
         Mr. & Mrs. Kaplan did not agree to 
         arbitration of any disputes involving their 
         agreement with First Options.  Here, by 
         contrast, Dayhoff explicitly agreed to 
         adjudicate all claims relating to the 1989 
         Frutteto License Agreement and the 1990 
         Frutteto Distribution Agreement in Italy 
         under Italian law.  Unlike Kaplan where the 
         issue was whether Mr. & Mrs. Kaplan had 
         agreed to arbitrate any claims, the issue 
         here is the scope of the arbitration and 
         forum selection clauses entered into by 
         Dayhoff. 
Br. at 21. 
         We agree with Dayhoff that the arbitration clause in 
the 1989 Licensing Agreement and the forum selection clause in 
the 1990 Distribution Agreement can be enforced only by the 
signatories to those agreements.  The opinions in Kaplan are the 
controlling precedent and thus we decline to follow the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Manetti-Farrow.  
Nor do we believe any of the other cases cited by appellees are 
persuasive here, as those cases all may be distinguished from 
that before us.  We also point out that Heinz Italia and H.J. 
Heinz should not by reason of their corporate relationship with 
Heinz Dolciaria be able to invoke the arbitration and forum 
selection clauses, for there is no more reason to disregard the 
corporate structure with respect to such claims as there would be 
to disregard it with respect to other legal matters.  If Heinz 
Italia and H.J. Heinz wanted to be able to invoke the arbitration 
and forum selection clauses, they should have directed Heinz 
Dolciaria to include appropriate language in the 1989 and 1990 
agreements allowing them to do so. 
         Of course, we recognize that Dayhoff did agree to the 
arbitration and forum selection clauses, whereas in Kaplan the 
Kaplans had not agreed to any arbitration or forum selection 
clause.  However, we find appellees' position unacceptable, in 
that under it Hershey (as well as the other non-signatories to 
the agreement) has the option to accept or reject the arbitration 
and forum selection clauses, while Dayhoff, under the district 
court's opinion, is compelled to accede to Hershey's wishes.  
The very fact that Hershey would have such a choice belies the 
existence of an agreement between Dayhoff and Hershey, an 
agreement that purportedly lies at the basis of appellees' 
argument.  For this reason, we will reverse the decision of the 
district court to dismiss all of Dayhoff's claims related to the 
1989 and 1990 Frutteto agreements against the non-signatories to 
those agreements, except for Sperlari, s.r.l., the successor to 
Heinz Dolciaria. 
         Dayhoff next urges us to hold that the arbitration 
clause in the License Agreement and the forum selection clause in 
the Frutteto Distribution Agreement should not be enforced in 
favor of even Heinz Dolciaria or Sperlari s.r.l.  Dayhoff claims 
that such clauses will not be enforced where "`trial in the 
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient 
that [the party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of 
[its] day in court.'"  Br. at 27 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1917 (1972)).  
Dayhoff asserts that appellees seek precisely that result: to 
prevent it from pursuing its rights and to evade all liability 
for their wrongful conduct.  Br. at 27. 
         The district court addressed these claims in its 
October 3, 1994 opinion.  In that court Dayhoff stated, interalia, that 
the enforcement of the forum selection clause would be 
unreasonable because Italian courts would have no authority to 
enforce preliminary or permanent injunctive relief in the United 
States, and that only in the United States courts could Dayhoff 
receive complete, consistent, and meaningful relief.  Dayhoff, 
Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 93-1794, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 
3, 1994).  After carefully reviewing these arguments, the 
district court found that it is not unreasonable to enforce the 
forum selection clauses: 
         The parties to the Agreements were 
         sophisticated business people and there is no 
         indication that Plaintiff was not aware, or 
         could not have made itself aware, of the 
         consequences that would result from including 
         the forum selection clauses in the Agreements 
         including whether the chosen forum was 
         adequate and convenient.  Simply because 
         Plaintiff is unhappy, in retrospect, about 
         the forum it designated is insufficient to 
         warrant a finding that the clauses are 
         unenforceable.  It would be patently unfair 
         to allow Plaintiff to avoid the mandates of 
         the forum selection clauses due to 
         inconvenience because we would merely be 
         shifting the burden of inconvenience to the 
         other party to the Agreement, an Italian 
         corporation.  We also believe that factors 
         which weigh heavily in favor of enforcing the 
         forum selection clauses include the fact that 
         the parties agreed that Italian law would 
         govern the Agreements and that the Agreements 
         are international in character and have, at 
         most, a tenuous relationship to the Western 
         District of Pennsylvania. 
Id. at 7. 
         We agree with the district court's analysis of this 
issue, except that we think the agreements have more than a 
tenuous relationship to the Western District of Pensylvania, as 
the contracts contemplate performance in the United States.  But 
this narrow area of disagreement does not lead us to reject the 
district court's conclusions that the arbitration and forum 
selection clauses are enforceable.  Therefore, we will affirm its 
finding that Dayhoff must litigate any claim relating to the 1989 
and 1990 Frutteto agreements according to the arbitration and the 
forum selection clauses of those agreements.  However, unlike the 
holding of the district court, our holding will apply only to 
Dayhoff's claims against Heinz Dolciaria (and its successor, 
Sperlari s.r.l.), because of our earlier holding that the clauses 
do not apply to non-signatories of the agreement. 
         In reaching our result on this point, we recognize that 
Dayhoff emphasizes it may have to litigate its claims in three 
different fora with three different sets of rules, and it asserts 
that it has "no reasonable expectation of being able to enforce 
its rights even after it has secured favorable rulings."  Br. at 
28.  We are not impressed by these arguments.  While we agree 
with Dayhoff that it did not agree on arbitration and forum 
selection clauses with respect to all the appellees, it did agree 
to litigate with Sperlari S.p.A. and Heinz Dolciaria in three 
different fora.  Furthermore, we do not see why, if it is 
successful in any forum, it could not enforce its rights, though 
enforcement might require ancillary litigation and the extension 
of comity to foreign judgments.  Undoubtedly, the procedural 
problems facing Dayhoff are daunting but Dayhoff's bargaining 
when it entered into the three agreements is the cause of that. 
                                 
                     B.  THE 1992 AGREEMENT 
         Dayhoff next asserts that the resolution of its claims 
regarding the unlawful termination of the Bulk Candy Distribution 
Agreement and the fraud that allegedly accompanied that 
termination centers on factual disputes, including credibility 
issues, and that the district court therefore should not have 
decided its claims relating to that agreement on a summary 
judgment motion.  As presented by Dayhoff, the facts supporting 
its claim that the termination clause was included in the 
executed contract by fraud include the following.  Heinz 
Dolciaria invited Lele to come to Italy for the final 
negotiations and execution of an agreement that he had been led 
to believe was essentially a "done deal."  Upon his arrival, Lele 
was confronted with Giacobone, an attorney for Heinz Italia, who 
told him that she would be representing Dayhoff's interests as 
well as those of Heinz Dolciaria. 
         At this meeting, Lele saw the termination provision for 
the first time.  Lele did not understand what it meant, and 
therefore asked Giacobone to clarify its meaning.  She explained 
that it was there to protect Heinz Dolciaria in case Dayhoff 
underwent a change of control.  Volta confirmed that meaning to 
Lele.  Based upon this explanation, Dayhoff accepted the clause 
and devoted its energies to the exclusive distributorship 
provided by the contract.  Giacobone subsequently testified that, 
contrary to what Lele claims she told him, she had put the 
provision in the contract so that Heinz Dolciaria could get out 
of the contract in the event that its business was sold.  
Moreover, Volta later took this position as to the meaning of the 
provision as well.  This evidence, according to Dayhoff, supports 
the conclusion that there was "fraud in the execution of the 
contract, or at least a jury could so find after weighing the 
evidence and assessing credibility."  Br. at 33.   
         In its July 10, 1995 opinion, the district court 
addressed these arguments in assessing the appellees' summary 
judgment motion regarding the 1992 agreement.  The dispute 
revolves around section 14.3 of the agreement, the final 
termination clause executed by the parties, which states: 
         Either party shall have the right to 
         terminate this Agreement upon written notice 
         to the other party in the event that the 
         other party becomes bankrupt, insolvent, or 
         goes into liquidation, or in the event that 
         either party assigns the whole or any 
         substantial part of its business or assets or 
         merges with another company or undergoes a 
         change of control. 
See Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 93-1794, slip op. at 7 
(W.D. Pa. July 10, 1995).  The appellees have contended that this 
provision is straightforward and directly applicable to the 
situation here involved.  Since a transfer of assets took place 
from Heinz Dolciaria to Sperlari s.r.l., whose stock Hershey 
acquired on September 14, 1993, appellees argue that the 
conditions triggering the application of section 14.3 were 
satisfied; that Heinz Italia's September 28, 1993 letter 
effectively terminated the three agreements with Dayhoff; and 
that all Dayhoff's claims relating to termination of the 1992 
Agreement therefore are foreclosed.  In response, Dayhoff relies 
upon its factual allegations presented above and asserts that 
fraud bars the termination of the 1992 Distribution Agreement. 
         As the district court noted, appellees point out that 
the 1992 Distribution Agreement contains an integration clause 
that bars any attempt to modify the terms of the agreement by 
reference to pre-agreement discussions or negotiations -- that 
is, by prohibiting parol evidence.  Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz 
Co., No. 93-1794, slip op. at 9 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 1995).  
Dayhoff responds that the parol evidence rule does not apply 
because Heinz Dolciaria fraudulently obtained the inclusion of 
the termination provision.  Br. at 34. 
         The district court correctly found that Dayhoff's 
argument conflicts with two recent decisions of the Pennsylvania 
courts, which state's law the parties agree is controlling on 
this issue.  In HCB Contractors v. Liberty Place Hotel Assoc., 
652 A.2d 1278 (Pa. 1995), the appellant general contractor filed 
mechanics' liens against four buildings it had helped erect.  
Appellees, the building owners, successfully demurred to the 
claims on the ground that HCB in two separate provisions in the 
contract documents had agreed not to file such liens, instead 
limiting its potential recovery to the owners' interests.  HCB 
argued on appeal that it had been induced fraudulently to sign 
the waiver of liens.  The question on appeal was whether 
allegedly false oral representations could alter the express 
waiver of liens in the contract.  The contract in question 
contained an integration clause. 
         The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the parol 
evidence rule barred consideration of prior representations 
concerning matters covered in the written contract, even those 
alleged to have been made fraudulently, unless the 
representations were fraudulently omitted from the contract.  
Otherwise, the parol evidence rule "`would become a mockery,'" 
id. at 1279 (quoting Nicolella v. Palmer, 248 A.2d 20 (Pa. 
1968)), and integrated contracts could be avoided or modified by 
claims of differing prior representations. 
         The second decision relied upon by the district court, 
1726 Cherry St. Partnership v. Bell Atlantic Properties, Inc., 
653 A.2d 663 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 664 A.2d 976 (Pa. 
1995), addressed the same issue found in HCB and here.  1726 
Cherry St. concerned Bell's acquisition of several parcels of 
land.  Appellants, the owners of one of the parcels, wanted 
theirs to be the last acquired, believing that this order of sale 
would bring them a better price than they otherwise would obtain.  
They were persuaded to sell their land sooner by the inclusion of 
a so-called "most favored nation" clause in the contract which 
retroactively would adjust their price upward if Bell acquired 
certain other specified parcels at higher prices.  Id. at 664. 
         Bell later acquired and paid a higher price for land 
known as the CIGNA Parcel.  The parties had not named the CIGNA 
Parcel in the 1726 Cherry St. contract so Bell did not consider 
itself bound to raise the price paid to the 1726 Cherry St. 
owners.  The owners brought suit for fraud, reformation, or 
rescission, claiming that Bell orally had misrepresented its 
intention not to purchase the CIGNA Parcel; otherwise, they would 
have insisted on the inclusion of the CIGNA Parcel in the list of 
properties subject to most-favored-nation treatment.  The trial 
court applied the parol evidence rule in entering judgment for 
Bell. 
         The Superior Court affirmed, 1726 Cherry St., 653 A.2d 
at 670, explaining Pennsylvania's distinction between fraud in 
the execution and fraud in the inducement.  Fraud in the 
execution applies to situations where parties agree to include 
certain terms in an agreement, but such terms are not included.  
Thus, the defrauded party is mistaken as to the contents of the 
physical document that it is signing.  Parol evidence is 
admissible in such a case only to show that certain provisions 
were supposed to be in the agreement but were omitted because of 
fraud, accident, or mistake.  Fraud in the inducement, on the 
other hand, does not involve terms omitted from an agreement, but 
rather allegations of oral representations on which the other 
party relied in entering into the agreement but which are 
contrary to the express terms of the agreement.  It is clear that 
Dayhoff alleges fraud in the inducement in this case, despite its 
protestations to the contrary. 
         In seeking to distinguish HCB and 1726 Cherry St., 
Dayhoff argues that the facts here differ, particularly in its 
claim that "an attorney said something that simply was not true, 
and moreover, this attorney stated that she was representing 
Dayhoff, another untruth."  Br. at 35-36.  However, we agree with 
the district court that the differing facts here do not affect 
the broad holdings of HCB or 1726 Cherry St. in any significant 
way.  Alternatively, Dayhoff again asserts, as it did in the 
district court, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not 
expressly rejected fraud in the inducement as an exception to the 
parol evidence rule.  Again agreeing with the district court, we 
find this argument meritless.  Accordingly, because the plain 
terms of section 14.3 cannot be altered by Dayhoff's factual 
claims of fraud in the inducement, even if Dayhoff's assertions 
are true, we agree with the holding of the district court that 
the termination provision of the 1992 Bulk Distribution Agreement 
is binding upon the parties.  Consequently, as the termination 
provision is absolutely clear and is applicable here, we will 
affirm the summary judgment granted against Dayhoff on its claims 
that Heinz Italia improperly terminated the 1992 Bulk Candy 
Distribution Agreement. 
         Our result on this issue also leads us to affirm the 
district court's judgment dismissing Dayhoff's tortious 
interference with contract, constructive trust, civil conspiracy, 
and restitution claims predicated on the termination of the 1992 
agreement.  There is no doubt that the conditions for the 
termination of the 1992 agreement were met.  Furthermore, 
Hershey did nothing wrong in requesting that the agreement be 
terminated.  After all, it was acquiring Heinz Italia's candy 
business and it did not want Dayhoff as a candy distributor.  
There was no reason why it had to retain Dayhoff in that role, at 
least with respect to the 1992 agreement.  Furthermore, we will 
not allow the claim for reformation to proceed either, as Dayhoff 
was well aware that section 14.3 was being included in the 1992 
agreement. 
         Dayhoff claims, however, that appellees' fraud was not 
limited to the execution of the contract, but that there also was 
fraud when Dayhoff falsely was assured that the sale to Hershey 
would not affect its contracts.  The district court rejected that 
claim as well when it granted appellees summary judgment. Dayhoff 
relies in part on the following allegations in making this second 
claim of fraud.  Seletti and Volta constantly reassured Lele that 
there was no reason to terminate Dayhoff's contracts and that the 
sale of Heinz Italia's confectionery business would have no 
effect on those contracts.  Dayhoff claims that, in fact, Volta 
told Lele that he should not worry.  Dayhoff thus claims that 
appellees made fraudulent statements and that the district court 
improperly attempted to interpret and weigh the evidence 
concerning these allegations.  Dayhoff asserts that numerous 
genuine issues of fact relate to the fraudulent conduct of 
appellees with regard to the termination of the Bulk Candy 
Distribution Agreement.  Dayhoff claims that these issues of fact 
directly relate to Dayhoff's claims for imposition of a 
constructive trust and for damages for civil conspiracy, tortious 
interference, and restitution. 
         We partially agree with Dayhoff.  Viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to it as the non-moving party, we cannot 
say that there are no genuine issues of material fact that a jury 
should evaluate in this case.  Thus, in this respect, unlike the 
district court, we are not satisfied that summary judgment should 
have been granted against Dayhoff on this particular claim 
related to the 1992 Bulk Distribution Agreement.  Therefore, we 
will reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
the limited extent that it precluded Dayhoff from proceeding with 
its fraud claim predicated on the allegations that it was 
defrauded when it was assured that the sale to Hershey would not 
affect its contracts with Heinz Dolciaria.  However, we limit 
Dayhoff's possible recovery with respect to the 1992 agreement to 
damages, as that agreement, after all, was terminated lawfully.  
We otherwise will affirm the summary judgment entered on the 1992 
agreement.  At this time, we do not consider the effect of our 
reversal on claims relating to the 1989 and 1990 agreements, as 
the court dismissed those claims without considering them on 
their merits.  To the extent that litigation regarding those 
agreements continues in the district court, the effect of the 
reversal may be considered on remand.   
                                 
          C.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER HEINZ ITALIA 
         Finally, Dayhoff disputes the district court's decision 
to dismiss all claims against Heinz Italia for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  Dayhoff notes that the transaction that serves as 
the predicate for all of its claims in this litigation is the 
$133,000,000 sale of Heinz Italia's confectionery business (Heinz 
Dolciaria) to Hershey, with the advance approval and 
participation of H.J. Heinz in Pittsburgh.  Dayhoff claims that 
Heinz Italia directly participated in all aspects of this 
transaction, which participation it claims to be sufficient to 
confer specific jurisdiction over Heinz Italia under 
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute. 
         In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, we take the allegations of the complaint as true.  
Narco Avionics, Inc. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 398, 
402 (E.D. Pa. 1992).  But once a defendant has raised a 
jurisdictional defense, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
by affidavits or other competent evidence that jurisdiction is 
proper.  Id. (citing North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas 
Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 
111 S.Ct. 133 (1990)); see also Mellon Bank (East) v. Diveronica 
Bros., 983 F.2d 551, 554 (3d Cir. 1993). 
         Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), we will apply Pennsylvania 
law to the jurisdictional issue.  Pennsylvania's long-arm statute 
authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
nonresidents "to the fullest extent allowed under the 
Constitution of the United States . . . based on the most minimum 
contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of 
the United States."  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  5322(b) (1981).  
Section 5322(a) sets forth a variety of examples of sufficient 
contact, such as "[t]ransacting any business in this 
Commonwealth."  Id.  5322(a)(1) (Purdon's Supp. 1995).  Section 
5322(b) further expands the potential bases for jurisdiction.  
When personal jurisdiction is based solely on minimum contacts 
under the long-arm statute, it is limited to "a cause of action 
or other matter arising from acts" which confer jurisdiction.  
Id.  5322(c).  As the district court noted, "[s]pecific 
jurisdiction arises when the plaintiff's claim is related to or 
arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum."  Dayhoff, 
Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 93-1794, slip op. at 13 (W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 3, 1994) (quoting Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. Farino, 
960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992)).  A plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a defendant purposefully has established 
"sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state that it `should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'"  Diveronica 
Bros., 983 F.2d at 554. 
         Dayhoff argues that Heinz Italia has had a wide range 
of contacts in Pennsylvania that would support the district 
court's exercise of jurisdiction over it.  The district court 
found, however, that even assuming that all of Dayhoff's 
allegations are true, none of the contacts gave rise to or 
related, in any way, to this litigation.  Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. 
Heinz Co., No. 93-1794, slip op. at 14 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 1994).  
The court concluded that the contacts between Heinz Italia and 
Hershey regarding the sale of the confectionery business could 
not properly be considered in a determination of whether there 
was personal jurisdiction, because "the sale of the Heinz Italia 
confectionery business is not the subject of this litigation."  
Id.  Moreover, the court found that Dayhoff had "provided no 
evidence which would indicate that any activities relating to the 
formation or breach of this agreement or the actions on the part 
of Dayhoff or Heinz Italia (who is not even a party to the 
Agreements) were directed toward this forum."  Id. at 14-15. 
         We disagree with the conclusion of the district court.  
We conclude, instead, that the court took too narrow a view of 
the "subject of this litigation."  In our view, this litigation 
is concerned intimately with Heinz Italia's sale of its 
confectionery business to Hershey in that Dayhoff alleges, 
apparently with good reason, that the sale itself precipitated 
the termination of its agreements.  Furthermore, the agreements 
were performed in the United States, and Heinz Italia was the 
party who sent the letter of September 28, 1993, terminating 
them.  Moreover, Dayhoff accuses Heinz Italia, inter alia, of 
tortious interference with contract, alleging that Heinz Italia 
interfered with its contracts with Heinz Dolciaria in order to 
sell that business to Hershey.  It seems to us that these very 
claims against Heinz Italia are the "subject of this litigation," 
not merely the contracts between Dayhoff and Heinz Dolciaria.  We 
see no need to discuss this point further because we think it 
clear that according to our view of the "subject of this 
litigation," Dayhoff has demonstrated that Heinz Italia has many 
contacts with Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
order of the district court dismissing all claims against Heinz 
Italia for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
 
                         IV.  CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the court's 
orders of October 3, 1994, and July 10, 1995, to the extent that 
those orders reflect the district court's conclusions that 
Dayhoff is bound by the arbitration and forum selection clauses 
of the 1989 and 1990 agreements with respect to its claims 
against Heinz Dolciaria and its successor, Sperlari s.r.l.  We 
also will affirm the summary judgment against Dayhoff on its 
claims based upon the 1992 agreement, except on its claim of 
fraud with respect to the alleged assurance to it that the sale 
to Hershey would not affect its contracts with Heinz Dolciaria.  
However, we limit recovery for that fraud, if it is established, 
to damages.  Otherwise, we will reverse the orders of October 3, 
1994, and July 10, 1995, and will remand the case to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  In 
particular, the case may proceed against the appellees other than 
Heinz Dolciaria and Sperlari s.r.l. in the district court without 
regard for the arbitration and forum selection clauses of the 
1989 and 1990 agreements, and the district court will exercise 
jurisdiction over Heinz Italia.  The action may proceed for fraud 
claims related to the termination of the 1992 agreement to the 
limited extent we have described.  The parties will bear their 
own costs on this appeal.  
 
 
 
 
